Open Housing: Submission of Legislatively Approved Act to Referendum Held Not Enjoinable by unknown
OPEN HOUSING: SUBMISSION OF LEGIS-
LATIVELY APPROVED ACT TO REFEREN-
DUM HELD NOT ENJOINABLE
In Spaulding v. Blair' the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit determined that the mere submission to state-wide
referendum of a proposed open-housing act for final approval by the
voters, under the procedure outlined in Article XVI of the Maryland
Constitution, was not a violation of fourteenth amendment rights
and could not be enjoined. During its 1967 session the Maryland
General Assembly passed, and the Governor approved, the state's
first open-housing enactment, known as Chapter 385, to take effect
on June 1, 1967.2 The Maryland Constitution provides that upon the
filing of appropriate petitions with the Secretary of State "any law
or part of a law capable of referendum" passed by the legislature
must be presented to the people for approval or rejection at the
polls.' When valid petitions4 were duly filed requesting submission of
Chapter 385 to a referendum on November 5, 1968, a group of
Negro citizens brought a class action against the Secretary of State
and various election officials for declaratory and injunctive relief to
prevent placing the referendum on the ballot. Conceding the
constitutionality of Chapter 385, the plaintiffs alleged that the
submission of the proposed law to the electorate for approval or
rejection would violate their privileges and immunities and deprive
them of equal protection of the law. The defendants moved for
dismissal, asserting that the case was not ripe and that the plaintiffs
failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The
district court found that a justiciable controversy did exist since the
theory of plaintiffs' suit was that mere submission of Chapter 385 to
referendum was constitutionally forbidden.' However, the court
dismissed for failure to state a meritorious claim, and the court of
appeals affirmed.
'403 F.2d 862 (4th Cir. 1968).
' MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, §§ 21-27 (1968).
MD. CONST. art. XVl, §§ 2-4.
'Secretary of State v. McLean, 249 Md. 436, 239 A.2d 919 (1968).
403 F.2d at 862.
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The power of referendum created by Article XVI was added to
the Maryland Constitution in 1915 as a conscious modification of
the principle of the principle of representative self-government.6 The
people, by reserving to themselves the right to accept or reject
legislative decisions of the elected law-making body, became the final
element in the legislative process. Their intervention by petition
before the effective date of a statute suspends that statute;7 it cannot
"become a law or take effect until thirty days after its approval by a
majority of the electors voting thereon." 8 Invoking the referendum
process therefore creates a time "when the law is not a law." 9
Furthermore, rejection by referendum cannot technically constitute a
repeal, for there is not yet a "law" to be repealed. Although
Maryland has been able to enact minimal anti-discrimination
legislation for public accommodations' 0 and employment practices"
despite the referendum provision, the state's initial attempt in the
area of open-housing became embroiled in a legal struggle at the
very time national policy in this field was being firmly established.
The positive right to open-housing in the federal sphere is founded
upon the Civil Rights Act of 1866 '2 codified as section 1982 of Title 42
of the United States Code which despite its limitations has been held
to bar all racial discrimination, both public and private, in the sale
and rental of property; 3 upon the fourteenth amendment guarantees
prohibiting state action which enforces 4 or encourages"s private
discrimination; and upon a most comprehensive measure included as
Title VIII of the 1968 Civil Rights Act. 6 Maryland's Chapter 385,
with its restrictive definition of "dwelling,"'' 7 pales in comparison to
' Beall v. State, 131 Md. 669, 677, 103 A. 99, 102 (1917); see Everstine, The Legislative
Process in Maryland, 10 MD. L. REv. 91, 138-54 (1949).
'See Barnes v. State ex rel. Pinkney, 236 Md. 564, 575, 204 A.2d 787, 793 (1964); First
Continental Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Director, 229 Md. 293, 299-304, 183 A.2d 347, 349-51
(1962).
'MD. CONST. art. XVI, §§ 2-4.
McGinnis v. Board of Supervisors of Elections, 244 Md. 65, 69, 222 A.2d 391, 394 (1966).
"See MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, §§ 21-27 (1968).
"Id. at §§ 17-20.
Ch. 114, § 16, 16 Stat. 144.
"Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 413-14 (1968).
"See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
"See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
Pub. L. No. 90-284.
'7 MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 21 (1968) (all buildings constructed before June I, 1967 or
for which permit was filed before that date and completion was by June I, 1968 as well as all
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the extensive federal protection currently available to Maryland citi-
zens in the field of open-housing.
Since federal law already provides comprehensive protection, the
question arises as to whether the separate states nonetheless have an
affirmative duty to enact supporting legislation or to prevent repeal
of existing legislation. This dispute frequently crystalizes in the
context of a referendum attempt. Although the California Supreme
Court has "grave doubts" as to the constitutionality of a proposed
amendment to the state constitution which would have effectively
repealed two existing open-housing laws and significantly impeded
new legislation in the field, it refused to enjoin the referendum,
preferring to pass on the question after the vote rather than
"interfere with the power of the people to propose laws and
amendments to the Constitution, and to adopt or reject the same at
the polls."' 8 When the amendment was approved by a wide margin, 9
the court promptly struck it down in Mulkey v. Reitman" as
involving state action infringing upon the fourteenth amendment by
encouraging discrimination in real property transactions. In Otey v.
Common Council of City of Milwaukee,z" however, the federal
district court was less hesitant to act before the people had voted,
and a referendum on a resolution to prevent any legislation on open-
housing for a two-year period was enjoined. Emphasizing the tense
social atmosphere," the court could see no adequate reason to allow
a referendum. The proposed resolution was deemed unconstitutional
on its face, 23 as the court felt that it would significantly involve the
city in private discrimination violative of the fourteenth amendment
by giving statutory assurance of non-interference. 4 Disregarding any
reference to state action or the fourteenth amendment, another
federal district court in Holmes v. Leadbetter25 enjoined a
condominiums, cooperatives, and owner-occupied dwellings containing fewer than twelve units
were exempt).
"Lewis v. Jordan, Sacramento No. 7549 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1964).
"CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE, STATEMENT OF THE VOTE AT GENERAL ELECTION.
Nov. 3. 1964, at 25 (1964) (4,526,460 for; 2,395,747 against).
"50 Cal. Rptr. 881, 413 P.2d 825 (1966), affd, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
:2 281 F. Supp. 264 (E.D. Wis. 1968).
2 d. at 277-79.
"Id. at 274 (a legislature cannot by statute irrevocably withdraw a topic from the scope of
future legislation) & 275.
Id. at 273.
"No. 31343 (E.D. Mich., Aug. 16, 1968); contra, Holland v. Board of Elections (decided
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referendum aimed at repeal of an existing municipal open-housing
ordinance by holding that simple repeal in this area would not be a
routine rescission and return to the status quo. Rather, repeal would
constitute an invitation to discriminate by apparently making legal
what had been proscribed. Since federal and local protection had
already been established by case and statute, existence of open-
housing was no longer a question for public vote. The referendum,
even if construed as nothing more than a poll, was "repugnant and
offensive." 6 Although the result of a referendum may be voided as a
deprivation of guaranteed rights," and the referendum itself may be
enjoined if the suggested law is unconstitutional on its face 0 or the
attempted repeal of existing law could be construed as encouraging
unconstitutional behavior, 9 no decision as yet has dealt with the
question posed in Spaulding v. Blair: whether a referendum should
be enjoined when it is proposed not to derogate guaranteed rights,
stifle future legislation or repeal present statutes, but only to
determine whether a new law admittedly constitutional, will be
enacted. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit decided that
such a referendum should not be enjoined.
In Spaulding v. Blair, despite the plaintiffs' characterization of
the referendum as an attempt to encourage discrimination by the re-
peal of an existing law,30 the court chose to review the submission of
Chapter 385 to the electorate presenting an opportunity for a
possible "decision of the voters to forego the adoption of supporting
legislation for the open-housing principle," which could in no way
diminish the rights of any individual or group guaranteed under
federal provisions.' There could be no contention that the re-
ferendum constituted a repeal of anti-discrimination legislation,
for by the terms of the state constitution no such law has yet taken
effect. Furthermore, even if eventual rejection at the polls could be
Feb. 7, 1968; petition for cert. filed May 7, 1968) (Ohio Supreme Court denied an appeal from
a lower court decision dismissing a challenge to the constitutionality of a city-wide referendum
that would nullify an existing fair-housing ordinance).
26 No. 31343 at 12.
2 See note 20 supra.
25See 281 F. Supp. 264 (E.D. Wis. 1968); Ellis v. Mayor and City Council, 234 F. Supp.
945 (D. Md. 1964), aJJd, 352 F.2d 123 (4th Cir. 1965).
29See notes 20, 25 supra.
See 403 F.2d at 864.
"Id. at 865.
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denominated a repeal, repealer alone was not deemed forbidden by
the fourteenth amendment.3 2 Citing Reitman33 to reinforce the
plaintiffs' admission that the state had no affirmative obligation to
enact open-housing,3 4 the court rejected plaintiffs' further reliance on
that case by carefully noting that, as distinguished from Reitman,
Spaulding involved no attempt to bar future legislation or to secure
a state constitutional right to discriminate-actions which would
impermissibly involve the state in the encouragement or
authorization of private discrimination.35 Rather, the holding of the
referendum would be neutral, giving solace or support to neither
side.36 Just as the vote of a member of the General Assembly against
Chapter 385 or the Governor's possible veto could not have been
enjoined as a denial of equal protection to plaintiffs, so also the
power of referendum was immune as an integral and constitutional
feature of the state's legislative process.37 Considerations of the
federal system dictated that "to the extent that the states do not
significantly involve themselves in deprivations of fundamental
rights" their legislative processes should remain exempt from federal
court restraints.38 Since the proposed law, if approved by the voters,
would be constitutional39 and if rejected would in no way diminish
plaintiffs' civil rights, 0 the mere submission of Chapter 385 to
referendum could not abridge constitutionally-guaranteed rights and
could not be enjoined.4
Spaulding v. Blair concludes that a "neutral" referendum pro-
cedure, one which may be invoked to challenge any legislative enact-
ment, may be constitutionally used to defeat proposed open-housing
legislation. That belief has apparently not been challenged by the
Supreme Court's recent decision in Hunter v. Erickson42 striking
down an amendment to an Ohio city charter which suspended a 1964
open-housing ordinance and provided that the 1964 ordinance and
I' ld. at 864-65.
"Id. at 864 nA.
Id. at 864.
35 Id.
Id. at 865.
"Id. at 863-65.
' Id. at 865.
"Id. at 864.
"Id. at 865.
4 1 /d.
"37 U.S.L.W. 4091 (U.S. Jan. 20, 1969).
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any future ordinance regulating the sale or lease of real property "on
the basis of race, color, religion, national origin or ancestry" must be
subjected to referendum for approval by a majority of the voters be-
fore such ordinances could become effective."3 The Court held that the
charter amendment denied equal protection of the law by requiring
a referendum in this area alone since it became "substantially more
difficult" for persons seeking open-housing legislation to find success
than for those who sought other ordinances dealing with the real pro-
perty market.4 Under the standard thus enunciated Maryland's
Article XVI, which imposes no special burden upon anti-discrimina-
tion legislation, would appear unobjectionable. Furthermore, the
Spaulding referendum procedure, unlike the constitutional amend-
ment involved in Reitman v. Mulkey,45 was not shown to have been
created with the "intent ' 46 of encouraging racial discrimination or
making open-housing legislation difficult to enact.47 On the other
hand, there remains the possibility that the Reitnian-Hunter majori-
ty could reverse Spaulding by focusing upon "the reality" of the
Maryland referendum procedure's "impact. 146 Voiding the referen-
dum process because of the practical disadvantage which it imposes
upon minority groups seeking protective laws, however, would be
tantamount to requiring that minority groups not be subjected to
political processes and hurdles which are normally incident to legis-
lative enactment. If carried to its logical extension, such a rationale
might be used to impose an affirmative duty on the states to enact leg-
islation favorable to minority groups who are politically incompetent
to enact legislation for themselves;49 and such analysis clearly would
go far beyond the Court's holdings in Reitman and Hunter. Thus,
since the Court is apparently not inclined to hold that the mere repeal
of open-housing legislation in itself constitutes a denial of equal pro-
"d. at 409 1.
Id. at 4092.
"387 U.S. 369 (1967).
"Id. at 376. In their dissent to Reitinan, Justices Harlan and Stewart, who concurrcd in
Hunter, indicated that it was unsubstantiated, as well as irrelevant, that Proposition 14 may have
been enacted with the intent of encouraging racial discrimination. Id. at 390-9 I.
" See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
"See Hunter v. Erickson, 37 U.S.L.W. 4091, 4093 (U.S. Jan. 20, 1969). But see Id. at
4093-94 (concurring opinion).
" Cf. Karst & Horowitz, Reinnan v. Mulkey: A Telophase of Substantive Equal Protection,
1967 Sup. CT. REV. 39, 55, 73.
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tection, ° the Fourth Circuit's decision in Spaulding will likely not be
overturned.
'"See Hunter v. Erickson, 37 U.S.L.W. 4091. 4092 n.5 (U.S. Jan. 20, 1969); Ritman v.
Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 376 (1967). But see Ranjel v. Lansing, 37 U.S.L.W. 2407 (W.D. Mich..
Jan. 8, 1969); Holmes v. Leadbetter, No. 31343 (E.D. Mich., Aug. 16, 1968).
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